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Abstract
Variational inequality problems allow for capturing an expansive class of problems, including convex
optimization problems, convex Nash games and economic equilibrium problems, amongst others. Yet in
most practical settings, such problems are complicated by uncertainty, motivating the examination of a
stochastic generalization of the variational inequality problem and its extensions in which the components
of the mapping contain expectations. When the associated sets are unbounded, ascertaining existence
requires having access to analytical forms of the expectations. Naturally, in practical settings, such
expressions are often difficult to derive, severely limiting the applicability of such an approach. Conse-
quently, our goal lies in developing techniques that obviate the need for integration and our emphasis lies
in developing tractable and verifiable sufficiency conditions for claiming existence. We begin by recapping
almost-sure sufficiency conditions for stochastic variational inequality problems with single-valued maps
provided in our prior work [42, 43] and provide extensions to multi-valued mappings. Next, we extend
these statements to quasi-variational regimes where maps can be either single or set-valued. Finally, we
refine the obtained results to accommodate stochastic complementarity problems where the maps are
either general or co-coercive. The applicability of our results is demonstrated on practically occuring
instances of stochastic quasi-variational inequality problems and stochastic complementarity problems,
arising as nonsmooth generalized Nash-Cournot games and power markets, respectively.
1 Introduction
Motivation: In deterministic regimes, a wealth of conditions exist for characterizing the solution sets of
variational inequality, quasi-variational inequality and complementarity problems (cf. [8, 10, 27]), including
sufficiency statements of existence and uniqueness of solutions as well as more refined conditions regarding
the compactness and connectedness of solution sets and a breadth of sensitivity and stability questions.
Importantly, the analytical verifiability of such conditions from problem primitives (such as the underlying
map and the set) is essential to ensure the applicability of such schemes, as evidenced by the use of such
conditions in analyzing a range of problems arising in power markets [19, 21, 50], communication networks [9,
38, 48, 56], structural analysis [39, 40], amongst others. The first instance of a stochastic variational inequality
problem was presented by King and Rockafellar [26] in 1993 and the resulting stochastic variational inequality
problem requires an x ∈ X such that
(y − x)TE[G(x, ξ(ω))] ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X,
where X ⊆ Rn, ξ : Ω→ Rd, G : X ×Rd → Rn, E[.] denotes the expectation in a component-wise sense, and
(Ω,F ,P) represents the probability space. In the decade that followed, there was relatively little effort on
addressing analytical and computational challenges arising from such problems. But in the last ten years,
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there has been an immense interest in the solution of such stochastic variational inequality problems via
Monte-Carlo sampling methods [22, 23, 28, 51]. But verifiable conditions for characterization of solution sets
have proved to be relatively elusive given the presence of an integral (arising from the expectation) in the map.
Despite the rich literature in deterministic settings, direct application of deterministic results to stochastic
regimes is not straightforward and is complicated by several challenges: First, a direct application of such
techniques on stochastic problems requires the availability of closed-form expressions of the expectations.
Analytical expressions for expectation are not easy to derive even for single-valued problems with relatively
simple continuous distributions. Second, any statement is closely tied to the distribution. Together, these
barriers severely limit the generalizability of such an approach. To illustrate the complexity of the problem
class under consideration, we consider a simple stochastic linear complementarity problem.1
Example 1. Consider the following stochastic linear complementarity problem:
0 ≤ x ⊥ E
[(
2 1
1 2
)
x+
(−2 + ω1
−4 + ω2
)]
≥ 0.
Specifically, this can be cast as an affine stochastic variational inequality problem VI(K,F ) where
K , R+2 and F (x) , E[G(x;ω)], where G(x;ω) ,
[(
2 1
1 2
)
x+
(−2 + ω1
−4 + ω2
)]
.
Consider two cases that pertain to either when the expectation is available in closed-form (a); or not (b):
(a) Expectation E[.] available in closed form: Suppose in this instance, ω is a random variable that
takes values ω1 of ω2, given by the following:
ω1 =
(
1
1
)
or ω2 =
(−1
−1
)
with probability 0.5.
Consequently, the stochastic variational inequality problem can be expressed as
0 ≤ x ⊥
[(
2 1
1 2
)
x+
(−2
−4
)]
≥ 0.
In fact, this problem is a strongly monotone linear complementarity problem and admits a unique solution
given by x∗ = (0, 2). If one cannot ascertain monotonicity, a common approach lies in examining coercivity
properties of the map; specifically, VI(K,F ) is solvable since there exists an xref ∈ K such that (cf. [10,
Ch. 2])
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
F (x)T (x− xref) > 0.
(b) Expectation E[.] unavailable in closed-form: However, in many practical settings, closed-form
expressions of the expectation are unavailable. Two possible avenues are available:
(i) If K is compact, under continuity of the expected value map, VI(K,F ) is solvable.
(ii) If there exists a single x ∈ K that solves VI(K,F (.;ω)) for almost every ω ∈ Ω, VI(K,F ) is solvable.
Clearly, if K is a cone and (i) does not hold. Furthermore (ii) appears to be possible only for pathological
examples and in this case, there does not exist a single x that solves the scenario-based VI(K,G(.;ω)) for
every ω ∈ Ω. Specifically, the unique solutions to VI(K,G(.;ω1)) and VI(K,G(.;ω2)) are x(ω1) = (0, 3/2)
and x(ω2) = (1/3, 7/3), respectively and since x(ω1) 6= x(ω2), avenue (ii) cannot be traversed. Conse-
quently, neither of the obvious approaches can be adopted yet VI(K,F ) is indeed solvable with a solution
given by x∗ = (0, 2).
Consequently, unless the set is compact or the scenario-based VI is solvable by the same vector in an
almost sure sense, ascertaining solvability of stochastic variational inequality problems for which the expec-
tation is unavailable in closed form does not appear to be immediately possible through known techniques.
1Formal definitions for these problems are provided in Section 1.1
2
In what could be seen as the first step in this direction, our prior work [43] examined the solvability of
convex stochastic Nash games by analyzing the equilibrium conditions, compactly stated as a stochastic
variational inequality problem. Specifically, this work relies on utilizing Lebesgue convergence theorems to
develop integration-free sufficiency conditions that could effectively address stochastic variational inequality
problems, with both single-valued and a subclass of multi-valued maps arising from nonsmooth Nash games.
As a simple illustration of the avenue adopted, consider Example 1 again and assume that the expectation is
unavailable in closed form, we examine whether the a.s. coercivity property holds (as presented in the next
section). It can be easily seen that there exists an xref ∈ K, namely xref , 0, such that
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
G(x;ω)T (x− xref) > 0, for ω = ω1 and ω = ω2.
It will be shown that satisfaction of this coercivity property in an almost-sure sense is sufficient for solvability.
But such statements, as is natural with any first step, do not accommodate stochastic quasi-variational prob-
lems and can be refined significantly to accommodate complementarity problems. Moreover, they cannot
accommodate multi-valued variational maps. The present work focuses on extending such sufficiency state-
ments to quasi-variational inequality problems and complementarity problems and accommodate settings
where the maps are multi-valued.
Contributions: This paper provides amongst the first attempts to examine and characterize solutions
for the class of stochastic quasi-variational inequality and complementarity problems when expectations
are unavailable in closed form. Our contributions can briefly be summarized as follows:
(i) Stochastic quasi-variational inequality problems (SQVIs): We begin by recapping our past
integration-free statements for stochastic VIs that required the use of Lebesgue convergence theorems and
variational analysis. Additionally, we provide extensions to regimes with multi-valued maps and specialize
the conditions for settings with monotone maps and Cartesian sets. We then extend these conditions to
stochastic quasi-variational inequality problems where in addition to a coercivity-like property, the set-
valued mapping needs to satisfy continuity, apart from other “well-behavedness” properties to allow for
concluding solvability. Finally, we extend the sufficiency conditions to accommodate multi-valued maps.
(ii) Stochastic complementarity problems (SCPs): Solvability of complementarity problems over
cones requires a significantly different tack. We show that analogous verifiable integration-free statements
can be provided for stochastic complementarity problems. Refinements of such statements are also provided
in the context of co-coercive maps.
(iii) Applications: Naturally, the utility of any sufficiency conditions is based on its level of applicability.
We describe two application problems. Of these, the first is a nonsmooth stochastic Nash-Cournot game
which leads to an SQVI while the second is a stochastic equilibrium problem in power markets which can be
recast as a stochastic complementarity problem. Importantly, both application settings are modeled with a
relatively high level of fidelity.
Remark: Finally, we emphasize three points regarding the relevance and utility of the provided statements:
(i) First, such techniques are of relevance when integration cannot be carried out easily and have less utility
when sample spaces are finite; (ii) There are settings where alternate models for incorporating uncertainty
have been developed [7, 35, 37]. Such models assume relevance when the interest lies in robust solutions.
Naturally, an expected-value formulation has less merit in such settings and correspondingly, such robust
approaches cannot capture risk-neutral decision-making.2 Consequently, the challenge of analyzing existence
of this problem cannot be done away with by merely changing the formulation, since an alternate formulation
may be inappropriate. (iii) Third, we present sufficiency conditions for solvability. Still, there are simple
examples which can be constructed in finite (and more general) sample spaces where such conditions will
not hold and yet solvability does hold. We believe that this does not diminish the importance of our results;
in fact, this is not unlike other sufficiency conditions for variational inequality problems. For instance,
we may construct examples where the coercivity of a map may not hold over the given set [10] but the
variational inequality problem may be solvable. However, in our estimation, in some of the more practically
2A similarly loose dichotomy exists between stochastic programming and robust optimization.
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occurring engineering-economic systems, such conditions do appear to hold, reinforcing the relevance of such
techniques. In particular, we show such conditions find applicability in a class of risk-neutral and risk-averse
stochastic Nash games in [42, 43]. In the present work, we show that such conditions can be employed for
analyzing a class of stochastic generalized Nash-Cournot games with nonsmooth price functions as well as for
a relatively more intricate networked power market in uncertain settings. Before proceeding to our results
we provide a brief history of deterministic and stochastic variational inequalities.
Background and literature review: The variational inequality problem provides a broad and unifying
framework for the study of a range of mathematical problems including convex optimization problems, Nash
games, fixed point problems, economic equilibrium problems and traffic equilibrium problems [10]. More
generally, the concept of an equilibrium is central to the study of economic phenomena and engineered sys-
tems, prompting the use of the variational inequality problem [18]. Harker and Pang [16] provide an excellent
survey of the rich mathematical theory, solution algorithms, and important applications in engineering and
economics while a more comprehensive review of the analytical and algorithmic tools is provided in the
recent two volume monograph by Facchinei and Pang [10].
Increasingly, the deterministic model proves inadequate when contending with models complicated by risk
and uncertainty. Uncertainty in variational inequality problems has been considered in a breadth of appli-
cation regimes, ranging from traffic equilibrium problems [7, 15], cognitive radio networks [30, 49], Nash
games [43, 37], amongst others. Compared to the field of optimization, where stochastic programming [4, 52]
and robust optimization [3] have provided but two avenues for accommodating uncertainty in static opti-
mization problems, far less is currently available either from a theoretical or an algorithmic standpoint in the
context of stochastic variational inequality problems. Much of the efforts in this regime have been largely
restricted to Monte-Carlo sampling schemes [13, 22, 26, 29, 57, 28, 59, 41], and a recent broader survey paper
on stochastic variational inequality problems and stochastic complementarity problems [32].
1.1 Formulations
To help explain the two main formulations for stochastic variational inequality problems found in literature -
the expected value formulation and expected residual minimization formulation; we now define the variational
inequality problem and its generalizations as well as its stochastic counterparts. Given a set K ⊆ Rn and a
mapping F : Rn → Rn, the deterministic variational inequality problem, denoted by VI(K,F ), requires an
x ∈ K such that
(y − x)T F (x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K. (VI(K,F ))
The quasi-variational generalization of VI(K,F ) referred to as a quasi-variational inequality, emerges when
K is generalized from a constant map to a set-valued map K : Rn → Rn with closed and convex images.
More formally, QVI(K,F ), requires an x ∈ K(x) such that
(y − x)T F (x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K(x). (QVI(K,F ))
If K is a cone, then the variational inequality problem reduces to a complementarity problem, denoted by
CP(K,F ), a problem that requires an x ∈ K such that
K 3 x ⊥ F (x) ∈ K∗ (CP(K,F ))
where K∗ , {y : yT d ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ K} and y ⊥ w implies yiwi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. In settings complicated
by uncertainty, stochastic generalizations of such problems are of particular relevance. Given a continu-
ous probability space (Ω,F ,P), let E[•] denote the expectation operator with respect to the measure P.
Throughout this paper, we often denote the expectation E [G(x; ξ(ω))] by F (x), where G(x; ξ(ω)) denotes
the scenario-based map, Fi(x) , E[Gi(x; ξ(ω))] and ξ : Ω → Rd is a d−dimensional random variable. For
notational ease, we refer to G(x; ξ(ω)) as G(x;ω) through the entirety of this paper.
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1.1.1 The expected-value formulation
We may now formally define the stochastic variational inequality problem as an expected-value formulation.
We consider this formulation in the analysis in this paper.
Definition 1.1 (Stochastic variational inequality problem (SVI(K,F ))). Let K ⊆ Rn be a closed
and convex set, G : Rn × Ω → Rn be a single-valued map and F (x) , E[G(x;ω)]. Then the stochastic
variational inequality problem, denoted by SVI(K,F ), requires an x ∈ K such that the following holds:
(y − x)T F (x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K, where F (x) , E[G(x;ω)]. (SVI(K,F ))
Figure 1 provides a schematic of the stochastic variational inequality problem. Note that when x solves
SVI(K,F ), there may exist ω ∈ Ω for which there exist y ∈ K such that (y − x)TG(x;ω) < 0.
x K
N (x;K)
 G(x;!1)
 G(x;!2)
 E[G(x;!)]
(y   x)TE[G(x;!)]   0, 8 y 2 X.
Figure 1: The stochastic variational inequality
(SVI(K,F )): The expected-value formulation
Naturally, in instances where the expectation is simple
to evaluate, as seen in Example 1 earlier, the resulting
SVI(K,F ) is no harder than its deterministic counterpart.
For instance, if the sample space Ω is finite, then the ex-
pectation reduces to a finite summation of deterministic
maps which is itself a deterministic map. Consequently,
the analysis of this problem is as challenging as a deter-
ministic variational inequality problem. Unfortunately, in
most stochastic regimes, this evaluation relies on a multi-
dimensional integration and is not a straightforward task.
In fact, a more general risk functional can be introduced in-
stead of the expectation leading to a risk-based variational
inequality problem that requires an x such that
( y − x )T ρ[G(x;ω)] ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ K,
where ρ[G(x;ω)] , E[G(x;ω)] + D[G(x;ω)] and D[•] is a map incorporating dispersion measures such as
standard deviation, upper semi-deviation, or the conditional value at risk (CVaR) (cf. [46, 47, 52] for recent
advances in the optimization of these risk measures).
Extensions to set-valued and specializations to conic regimes follow naturally. For instance, if K is a point-to-
set mapping defined as K : Rn → Rn, then the resulting problem is a stochastic quasi-variational inequality,
and is denoted by SQVI(K,F ). When K is a cone, then VI(K,F ) is equivalent to a complementarity problem
CP(K,F ) and its stochastic generalization is given next.
Definition 1.2 (Stochastic complementarity problem (SCP(K,F ))). Let K be a closed and convex
cone in Rn, G : Rn × Ω → Rn be a single-valued mapping and F (x) , E[G(x;ω)]. Then the stochastic
complementarity problem, denoted by SCP(K,F ), requires an x ∈ K such that
K 3 x ⊥ F (x) ∈ K∗, where F (x) = E [G(x;ω)] .
If the integrands of the expectation (G(x;ω)) are multi-valued instead of single-valued, then we denote the
mapping by Φ. Accordingly, the associated variational problems are denoted by SVI(K,Φ), SQVI(K,Φ) and
SCP(K,Φ).
The origin of the expected-value formulation can be traced to a paper by King and Rockafellar [26] where the
authors considered a generalized equation [44, 45] with an expectation-valued mapping. Notably, the analysis
and computation of the associated solutions are hindered significantly when the expectation is over a general
measure space. Evaluating this integral is challenging, at best, and it is essential that specialized analytical
and computational techniques be developed for this class of variational problems. From an analytical stand-
point, Ravat and Shanbhag have developed existence statements for equilibria of stochastic Nash games that
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obviate the need to evaluate the expectation by combining Lebesgue convergence theorems with standard
existence statements [42, 43]. Our earlier worked focused on Nash games and examined such settings with
nonsmooth payoff functions and stochastic constraints. It represents a starting point for our current study
where we focus on more general variational inequality and complementarity problems and their generaliza-
tions and refinements. Accordingly, this paper is motivated by the need to provide sufficiency conditions for
stochastic variational inequality problems, stochastic quasi-variational inequality problems, and stochastic
complementarity problems. In addition, we consider variants when the variational maps are complicated
by multi-valuednes. Stability statements for stochastic generalized equations have been provided by Liu,
Ro¨misch, and Xu [33].
From a computational standpoint, sampling approaches have addressed analogous stochastic optimization
problems effectively [31, 51], but have focused relatively less on variational problems. In the latter con-
text, there have been two distinct threads of research effort. Of these, the first employs sample-average
approximation schemes [51]. In such an approach, the expectation is replaced by a sample-mean and the
effort is on the asymptotic and rate analysis of the resulting estimators, which are obtainable by solving a
deterministic variational inequality problem (cf. [13, 41, 54, 55]). A rather different track is adopted by Jiang
and Xu [22] where a stochastic approximation scheme is developed for solving such stochastic variational
inequality problems. Two regularized counterparts were presented by Koshal, Nedic´, and Shanbhag [29, 28]
where two distinct regularization schemes were overlaid on a standard stochastic approximation scheme (a
Tikhonov regularization and a proximal-point scheme), both of which allow for almost-sure convergence. Im-
portantly, this work also presents distributed schemes that can be implemented in networked regimes. A key
shortcomings of standard stochastic approximation schemes is the relatively ad-hoc nature of the choice of
steplength sequences. In [58], Yousefian, Nedic´, and Shanbhag develop distributed stochastic approximation
schemes where users can independently choose a steplength rule. Importantly, these rules collectively allow
for minimizing a suitably defined error bound and are equipped with almost-sure convergence guarantees.
Finally, Wang et al. [53] focus on developing a sample-average approximation method for expected-value
formulations of the stochastic variational inequality problems while Lu and Budhiraja [34] examine the con-
fidence statements associated with estimators associated with a sample-average approximation scheme for
stochastic variational inequality problem, again with expectation-based maps.
1.1.2 The expected-residual minimization (ERM) formulation
While there are many problem settings where expected-value formulations are appropriate (such as when
modeling risk-neutral decision-making in a competitive regime) but there are also instances where the
expected-value formulation proves inappropriate. A case in point arises when attempting to obtain so-
lutions to a variational inequality problem that are robust to parametric uncertainty; such problems might
arise when faced with traffic equilibrium or structural design problems. Given a random mapping G, the
almost-sure formulation of the stochastic variational inequality problem requires a (deterministic) vector
x ∈ K such that for almost every ω ∈ Ω,
(y − x)TG(x;ω) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ K. (1)
Naturally, if K is an n−dimensional cone, then (1) reduces to CP(K,G(.;ω)), a problem that requires an x
such that for almost all ω ∈ Ω,
K 3 x ⊥ G(x;ω) ∈ K∗. (2)
Yet, we believe that obtaining such an x is possible only in pathological settings. Instead, one approach
for resolving such a problem has emerged through the minimization of the expected residual. For instance,
if K , Rn+, this problem is a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) and for a fixed but arbitrary
realization ω ∈ Ω, the residual of this system can be minimized as follows:
minimize
x≥0
‖Φ(x;ω)‖,
where Φ(x;ω) denotes the equation reformulation of the NCP (See [10]). If the Fischer-Burmeister φFB is
chosen as the C-function, the expected residual minimization (ERM) problem in [6, 11] solves the following
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stochastic program to compute a solution of the stochastic NCP (2):
minimize
x≥0
E [‖ΦFB(x;ω) ‖] ,
where ΦFB(x;ω) ,
(√
x2i +Gi(x;ω)
2 − (xi +Gi(x;ω) )
)n
i=1
;
(3)
see [32, equation (3.8)]. In [36], Luo and Lin minimize the expected residual while convergence analysis
of the expected residual minimization (ERM) technique has been carried out in the context of stochastic
Nash games [37] and stochastic variational inequality problems [35]. In more recent work, Chen, Wets, and
Zhang [7] revisit this problem and present an alternate ERM formulation, with the intent of developing a
smoothed sample average approximation scheme. In contrast with the expected-value formulation and the
almost-sure formulation, Gwinner and Raciti [14, 15] consider an infinite-dimensional formulation of the
variational inequality for capturing randomness and provide discretization-based approximation procedures
for such problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline our assumptions used, motivate
our study by considering two application instances, and provide the relevant background on integrating
set-valued maps. In section 3, we recap our sufficiency conditions for the solvability of stochastic variational
inequality problems with single and multi-valued mappings and we provide results for the stochastic quasi-
variational inequality problems with single and multi-valued mappings. Refinements of the statements for
SVIs are provided for the complementarity regime in Section 4 under varying assumptions on the map.
Finally, in section 5, we revisit the motivating examples of section 2 and verify that the results developed in
this paper are indeed applicable.
2 Assumptions, examples, and background
In Section 2.1, we provide a summary of the main assumptions employed in the paper. The utility of such
models is demonstrated by discussing some motivating examples in Section 2.2. Finally, some background
is provided on the integrals of set-valued maps in Section 2.3.
2.1 Assumptions
We now state the main assumptions used throughout the paper and refer to them when appropriate. The
first of these pertains to the probability space.
Assumption 1 (Nonatomicity of measure P). The probability space P = (Ω,F ,P) is nonatomic.
The next assumption focuses on the properties of the single-valued map, referred to as F .
Assumption 2 (Continuity and integrability of F ).
(i) G : Rn × Ω → Rn is a single-valued map. Furthermore, G(x;ω) is continuous in x for almost every
ω ∈ Ω and is integrable in ω, for every x.
(ii) F (x) = E[G(x;ω)] is continuous in x.
Note that, the assumption of Lipschitz continuity of G(x;ω) with an integrable Lipschitz constant implies
that E[G(x;ω)] is also Lipschitz continuous. We now recall the definition of integrably bounded set-valued
maps to be used in the assumption to follow.
Definition 2.1 (Integrably bounded set-valued map). A set-valued map H that maps from Ω into nonempty,
closed subsets of Rn is integrably bounded if there exists a nonnegative integrable function k ∈ L1(Ω,R,P)
such that
H(ω) ⊆ k(ω)B(0, 1) almost everwhere.
The next two assumptions pertain to the set-valued maps employed in this paper. When the map is multi-
valued, to avoid confusion, we employ the notation Φ(x), defined as Φ(x) , E[Φ(x;ω)], and impose the
following assumptions.
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Assumption 3 (Lower semicontinuity and integrability of Φ). Φ : Rn × Ω → 2Rn is a set-valued map
satisfying the following:
(i) Φ(x;ω) has nonempty and closed images for every x and every ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) Φ(x;ω) is lower semicontinuous in x for almost all ω ∈ Ω and integrably bounded for every x.
Finally, when considering quasi-variational inequality problems, K is a set-valued map, rather than a constant
map.
Assumption 4. The set-valued map K : Rn → 2Rn is deterministic, closed-valued, convex-valued.
We conclude this subsection with some notation. cl(U) denotes the closure of a set U ⊂ Rn, bd(U) denotes
the boundary of the set U and dom(K) denotes the domain of the mapping K.
2.2 Examples
We now provide two instances of where stochastic variational problems arise in practice.
Nonsmooth stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium problems: Cournot’s oligopolistic model is amongst
the most widely used models for modeling strategic interactions between a set of noncooperative firms [12].
Under an assumption that firms produce a homogenous product, each firm attempts to maximize profits by
making a quantity decision while taking as given, the quantity of its rivals. Under the Cournot assumption,
the price of the good is assumed to be dependent on the aggregate output in the market. The resulting Nash
equilibrium, qualified as the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, represents a set of quantity decisions at which no
firm can increase profit through a unilateral change in quantity decisions. unilaterally changing the quantity
of the product it produces. To accommodate uncertainty in costs and prices in Nash-Cournot models and
loss of differentiability of price functions which can occur for example by introduction of price caps [21] we
consider a stochastic generalization of the classical deterministic Nash-Cournot model and allow for piecewise
smooth price functions, as captured by the following assumption on costs and prices.
Assumption 5. Suppose the cost function ci(xi) is an increasing convex twice continuously differentiable
function for all i = 1, . . . , N . Let X ,
∑n
i=1 xi. Since xi denotes the quantity produced, xi ≥ 0. The price
function p(X;ω) is a decreasing piecewise smooth convex function where p(X;ω) is given by
p(X;ω) =

p1(X;ω), 0 ≤ X ≤ β1
pj(X;ω), βj−1 ≤ X ≤ βj , j = 2, . . . , s
ps(X;ω), βs ≤ X
(4)
where pj(X;ω) = aj(ω) − bj(ω)X is a strictly decreasing affine function of X for j = 1, . . . , s. Finally,
β1, . . . , βs are a set of increasing positive scalars and (aj(ω), bj(ω)) are positive in an almost-sure sense and
integrable for j = 1, . . . , s.
Consider an N−player generalized Nash-Cournot game. Given the tuple of rival strategies x−i, the ith
player’s strategy set is given by Ki(x−i) while his objective function is given by E[fi(x;ω)] , ci(xi) −
E[p(x;ω)xi]. Then {x∗i }Ni=1 denotes a stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium if x∗i solves the convex optimiza-
tion problem Gi(x
∗
−i), defined as
minimize
xi
E[fi(x;ω)]
subject to xi ∈ Ki(x−i).
The equilibrium conditions of this problem are given a stochastic QVI with multi-valued mappings. In
section 5, we revisit this problem with the intent of developing statements about existence of solutions
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Strategic behavior in power markets: Consider a power market model in which a collection of genera-
tion firms compete in a single-settlement market. Economic equilibria in power markets has been extensively
studied using a complementarity framework; see [21, 20]. Our model below is based on the model of Hobbs
and Pang [21] which we modify to account for uncertainty in prices and costs.
Consider a set of nodes N of a network. The set of generation firms is indexed by f , where f belongs to
the finite set F . At a node i in the network, a firm f may generate gfi units at node i and sell sfi units to
node i. The total amount of power sold to node i by all generating firms is Si. The generator firms’ profits
are revenue less costs. If the nodal power price at node ith is a random function given by pi(Si;ω) where
pi(Si;ω) is a decreasing function of Si, then the firms’ revenue is just the price times sales sfi. The costs
incurred by the firm f at node i are the costs of generating gfi and transmitting the excess (sfi − gfi). Let
the cost of generation associated with firm f at node i be given by cfi(gfi;ω) and the cost of transmitting
power from an arbitrary node (referred to as the hub) to node i be given by wi. The constraint set ensures a
balance between sales and generation at all nodes, nonnegative sales and generation and generation subject
to a capacity limit. The price and cost functions are assumed to satisfy the following requirement.
Assumption 6. For i ∈ N , the price function pi(Si;ω) is a decreasing function with its absolute value
bounded above by a nonnegative integrable function p¯i(ω). Furthermore, the cost functions cfi(gfi;ω) are
nonnegative and increasing.
The resulting problem faced by generating firm f requires determining sales sfi and generation gfi at all
nodes i and is captured as follows:
maximize
sfi, gfi
E
[∑
i∈N
( pi(Si;ω)sfi − cfi(gfi;ω)− (sfi − gfi)wi )
]
subject to
{
0 ≤ gfi ≤ capfi
0 ≤ sfi
}
, ∀ i ∈ N
and
∑
i∈N
( sfi − gfi ) = 0.
Note that, the generating firm sees the transmission fee wi and the rival firms’ sales s−fi ≡ {shi : h 6= f} as
exogenous parameters to its optimization problem even though they are endogenous to the overall equilibrium
model as we will see shortly. The ISO sees the transmission fees w = (wi)i∈N as exogenous and prescribes
flows y = (yi)i∈N as per the following linear program
maximize
∑
i∈N
yiwi
subject to
∑
i∈N
PDFijyi ≤ Tj , ∀ j ∈ K,
where K is the set of all arcs or links in the network with node set N , Tj denotes the transmission capacity
of link j, yi represents the transfer of power (in MW) by the system operator from a hub node to node node
i and PDFij denotes the power transfer distribution factor, which specifies the MW flow through link j as
a consequence of unit MW injection at an arbitrary hub node and a unit withdrawal at node i.
Finally, to clear the market, the transmission flows yi must must balance the net sales at each node:
yi =
∑
f∈F
( sfi − gfi ) , ∀ i ∈ N .
The above market equilibrium problem which comprises of each firm’s problem, the ISO’s problem and
market-clearing condition, can be expressed as a stochastic complementarity problem by following the tech-
nique from [21]. This equivalent formulation of the above market equilibrium problem is described in the last
section 5. We also illustrate the solvability of such problems using the framework developed in this paper.
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2.3 Background on integrals of set-valued mappings
Recall that by Assumption 1, (Ω,F ,P) is a nonatomic continuous probability space. Consider a set-valued
map H that maps from Ω into nonempty, closed subsets of Rn . We recall three definitions from [1, Ch. 8]
Definition 2.2 (Measurable set-valued map). A map H is measurable if the inverse image of each open set
in Rn is a measurable set: for all open sets O ⊆ Rn, we have
H−1(O) = {ω ∈ Ω | H(ω) ∩O 6= ∅} ∈ F .
Definition 2.3 (Measurable selection). Suppose a measurable map h : Ω → Rn satisfies h(ω) ∈ H(ω) for
almost all ω ∈ Ω. Then h is called a measurable selection of H.
The existence of a measurable selection is proved in [1, Th. 8.1.3].
Definition 2.4 (Integrable selection). A measurable selection h : Ω → Rn is an integrable selection if
E[h(ω)] <∞ where
E[h(ω)] =
∫
Ω
hdP <∞.
The set of all integrable selections of H is denoted by H and is defined as follows:
H , {h ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P) : h(ω) ∈ H(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω} ,
Definition 2.5 (Expectation of a set-valued map). The expectation of the set-valued map H, denoted by
E[H(ω)], is the set of integrals of integrable selections of H:
E[H(ω)] ,
∫
Ω
HdP ,
{∫
Ω
hdP | h ∈ H
}
.
If the images of H(ω) are convex then this set-valued integral is convex [1, Definition 8.6.1]. If the assumption
of convexity of images of H does not hold, then the convexity of this integral follows from Th. 8.6.3 [1], pro-
vided that the probability measure is nonatomic. We make precisely such an assumption (See Assumption 1)
and are therefore guaranteed that the integral of the set-valued map H is a convex set [1, Th. 8.6.3].
Recall that a point z¯ of a convex set K is said to be extremal if there are no two points x, y ∈ K such that
λx+ (1− λ)y = z¯ for λ ∈ (0, 1) and is denoted by z¯ ∈ ext(K). Similarly, as per Def. 8.6.5 [1], we define an
extremal selection as follows:
Definition 2.6 (Extremal selection). Given the convex set
∫
Ω
HdP, an integrable selection h ∈ H is an
extremal selection of H if∫
Ω
hdP is an extremal point of the closure of the convex set
∫
Ω
HdP.
The set of all extremal selections is denoted by He and is defined as follows:
He ,
{
h ∈ H |
∫
Ω
hdP ∈ ext
(
cl
(∫
Ω
HdP
))}
.
By Theorem [1, Th. 8.6.3], we have the following Lemma for the representation of extremal points of closure
of
∫
Ω
HdP.
Theorem 1 (Representation of extreme points of set-valued integral [1, Th. 8.6.3]). Suppose Assumption 1
holds and let H be a measurable set-valued map from Ω to subsets of Rn with nonempty closed images.
Then the following hold:
(a)
∫
Ω
HdP is convex and extremal points of cl(
∫
Ω
HdP) are contained in
∫
Ω
HdP.
(b) If x ∈ ext (cl (∫
Ω
HdP
))
, then there exists a unique h ∈ He with x =
∫
Ω
hdP.
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(c) If H is integrably bounded, then the integral
∫
Ω
HdP is also compact.
As a corollary to the above theorem, we have a representation of points in a set-valued integral as follows.
Corollary 2 (Representation of points in a set-valued integral [1, Th. 8.6.6]). Let H be a measurable
integrably bounded set-valued map from Ω to subsets of Rn with nonempty closed images. If P is nonatomic,
then for every x ∈ ∫
Ω
HdP, there exist n+ 1 extremal selections hk ∈ He and n+ 1 measurable sets Ak ∈ F ,
k = 0, · · · , n, such that
x =
∫
Ω
(
n∑
k=1
χAkhk
)
dP
where χAk is the characteristic function of Ak.
3 Stochastic quasi-variational inequality problems
In this section, we develop sufficiency conditions for the solvability of stochastic quasi-variational inequality
problems under a diversity of assumptions on the map. More specifically, we begin by recapping sufficiency
conditions for the solvability of stochastic variational inequality problems with single-valued and multi-valued
maps in Section 3.1. In many settings, the variational inequality problems may prove incapable of capturing
the problem in question. For instance, the equilibrium conditions of convex generalized Nash games are given
by a quasi-variational inequality problem. As mentioned earlier, when the constant map K is replaced by a
set-valued map K : Rn → Rn, the resulting problem is an SQVI. In this section, we extend the sufficiency
conditions presented in the earlier section to accommodate the SQVI(K,F ) (Section 3.2) and SQVI(K,Φ)
(Section 3.3), respectively. Throughout this section, Assumption 4 holds for the set-valued map K.
3.1 SVIs with single-valued and multi-valued mappings
In this section, we begin by assuming that the scenario-based mappings G(•;ω) are single-valued for each
ω ∈ Ω. With this assumption, we provide sufficient conditions that the scenario-based VI(K,G(•;ω)) must
satisfy in order to conclude the existence of solution to the stochastic SVI(K,F ) without requiring the
evaluation of expectation operator. Recall that in SVI(K,F ), F (x) = E[G(x;ω)]. In particular, in the next
proposition, we show that if a certain coercivity condition holds for the scenario-based map G(•;ω) in an
almost-sure sense then existence of the solution to the above SVI may be concluded without resorting to
formal evaluation of the expectation.
Proposition 3 (Solvability of SVI(K,F )). Consider a stochastic variational inequality SVI(K,F ). Suppose
Assumption 2 holds. Suppose there exists an xref ∈ K such that the following hold:
(i) lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
G(x;ω)T (x− xref)] > 0 almost surely;
(ii) Suppose there exists a nonnegative integrable function u(ω) such that G(x;ω)T (x− xref) ≥ −u(ω)
holds almost surely for any x.
Then the stochastic variational inequality SVI(K,F ) has a solution.
Proof. See appendix.
In settings where K is a Cartesian product, defined as
K ,
N∏
ν=1
Kν , (5)
VI(K,F ) is a partitioned variational inequality probem, as defined in [10, Ch. 3.5]. Accordingly, Proposi-
tion 3 can be weakened so that even if the coercivity property holds for just one index ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the
stochastic variational inequality is solvable.
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Proposition 4 (Solvability of SVI(K,F ) for Cartesian K). Consider a stochastic variational inequality
SVI(K,F ) where K is a Cartesian product of closed and convex sets as specified in (5). Suppose that
Assumption 2 and the following hold:
(i) There exists an xref ∈ K and an index ν ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that for any x ∈ K,
lim inf
‖xν‖→∞,xν∈Kν
[
Gν(x;ω)
T (xν − xrefν )
]
> 0
holds in an almost sure sense; and
(ii) For the above ν and for any x, suppose there exists a nonnegative integrable function u(ω) such that
Gν(x;ω)
T (xν − xrefν ) ≥ −u(ω) holds almost surely for any x.
Then SVI(K,F ) admits a solution.
Proof. See appendix.
It is well known that strong monotonicity of the map F and convexity of the set K guarantee existence of
solution for the deterministic VI(K,F ) [10, Theorem 2.3.3]. In fact, it may be recalled that if F (x) is a
strongly monotone map then for any reference vector xref ∈ K, we have that
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
F (x)T (x− xref) = lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
(F (x)− F (xref) + F (xref))T (x− xref)
≥ lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
[
η‖x− xref‖2 + F (xref)T (x− xref)] = +∞,
where the first term tends to +∞ at a quadratic rate while the second term may tend to ±∞ at a linear
rate. In effect, we have that when F (x) is a strongly monotone map, the coercivity requirement holds
immediately and existence follows. It follows that if G(x;ω) is a strongly monotone map for almost every ω
with constant η(ω) where η(ω) ≥ η a.s., then F (x) is a strongly monotone map and SVI(K,F ) is solvable with
a unique solution. We now present a similar result for stochastic variational inequalities SVI(K,F ) under
the assumption that the mapping G(x;ω) is a monotone mapping over K for almost every ω ∈ Ω, a weaker
set of sufficient conditions as compared to Propositon 3 guarantees existence of solution for SVI(K,F ).
Corollary 5 (Solvability of SVI(K,F ) under monotonicity). Consider SVI(K,F ) and suppose that Assump-
tion 2 holds. Further, let G(x;ω) be a monotone mapping on K for almost every ω ∈ Ω. Suppose there exists
an xref ∈ K such that the following hold:
(i) lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
G(xref;ω)T (x− xref)] > 0 holds in almost sure sense;
(ii) Suppose there exists a nonnegative integrable function u(ω) such that G(xref;ω)T (x− xref) ≥ −u(ω)
holds almost surely for any x.
Then SVI(K,F ) is solvable.
Proof. See appendix.
Next, we consider a stochastic variational inequality SVI(K,Φ) where Φ(x) , E[Φ(x;ω)] and Φ(x;ω) is a
multi-valued mapping. Before proceeding to prove existence of solutions to SVIs with multi-valued maps,
we restate Corollary 2 for the case of the set-valued integral Φ(x) = E[Φ(x;ω)] of interest.
Lemma 6 (Representation of elements of set-valued integral as an integral of convex combination of extremal
selections). Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let Φ be a measurable integrably bounded set-valued map from
Rn × Ω to subsets of Rn with closed nonempty images. Then any w ∈ E[Φ(x;ω)] can be expressed as
w =
∫
Ω
g(x;ω)dP
where g(x;ω) =
∑n
k=1 λk(x)fk(x;ω) and λk(x) ≥ 0,
∑n
k=0 λk(x) = 1 and each fk(x;ω) is an extremal
selection of Φ(x;ω).
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Proof. Since w ∈ E[Φ(x;ω)] and E[Φ(x;ω)] is a convex set, thus by Carathe´odory’s theorem for convex sets,
there exists λk(x) ≥ 0, wk ∈ ext (cl (E[Φ(x;ω)])) such that
w =
n∑
k=0
λk(x)wk,
n∑
k=0
λk(x) = 1
Now, since wk ∈ ext (cl (E[Φ(x;ω)])), by [1, Th. 8.6.3], for each index k, there exists an extremal selection
fk(x;ω) from Φ(x;ω) such that
∫
Ω
fk(x;ω)dP = wk. Thus, we obtain
w =
n∑
k=0
λk(x)
∫
Ω
fk(x;ω)dP,
which can be rewritten as
w =
∫
Ω
g(x;ω)dP
where g(x;ω) =
∑n
k=0 λk(x)fk(x;ω). The required representation result follows.
We begin by providing a coercivity-based sufficiency condition for deterministic multi-valued variational
inequalities [25].
Theorem 7 (Solvability of VI (K,Φ)[25, Th. 2.1,2.2]). Suppose K is a closed and convex set in Rn and let
Φ : K ⇒ Rn be a lower semicontinuous multifunction with nonempty closed and convex images. Consider
the following statements:
(a) Suppose there exists an xref ∈ K such that L<(K,Φ) is bounded (possibly empty) where
L<(K,Φ) ,
{
x ∈ K : inf
y∈Φ(x)
(x− xref)T y < 0
}
. (6)
(b) The variational inequality VI(K,Φ) is solvable
Then, (a) implies (b). Furthermore, if Φ(x) is a pseudomonotone mapping over K, then (a) is equivalent to
(b).
Using this condition, we proceed to develop sufficiency conditions for the existence of solutions to SVI(K,Φ).
Proposition 8 (Solvability of SVI(K,Φ)). Consider SVI(K,Φ) and suppose assumptions 1 and 3 hold.
Further, suppose the following hold:
(i) Suppose there exists an xref ∈ K such that
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
(
inf
w∈Φ(x;ω)
wT (x− xref)
)
> 0 almost surely.
(ii) For the above xref, suppose there exists a nonnegative integrable function u(ω) such that g(x;ω)T (x−
xref) ≥ −u(ω) holds almost surely for any integrable selection g(x;ω) of Φ(x;ω) and for any x.
Then SVI(K,Φ) is solvable.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two parts.
(a) We first show that the following coercivity condition holds for the expected value map: there exists an
xref ∈ K such that
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
(
inf
w∈Φ(x)
wT (x− xref)
)
> 0. (7)
(b) If (a) holds, then we show that for the given xref ∈ K, the set L<(K,Φ) is bounded (possibly empty)
where L<(K,Φ) is defined in (6).
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Proof of (a): We proceed by a contradiction and assume that (7) does not hold for the expected value
map. Thus, for any xref, there exists a sequence xk ∈ K with ‖xk‖ → ∞ such that
lim inf
k→∞
(
inf
w∈Φ(xk)
wT (xk − xref)
)
≤ 0.
Since Φ(xk) is a closed set, the infimum above is attained at yk ∈ Φ(xk). Thus, we have
lim inf
k→∞
[
yTk (xk − xref)
] ≤ 0 (8)
Now, yk ∈ Φ(xk) = E[Φ(xk;ω)]. By the representation Lemma (Lemma 6), since yk ∈ Φ(xk), we have that
yk =
∫
Ω
gk(xk;ω)dP
for some gk(xk;ω) =
∑n
l=1 λl(xk)fl(xk;ω) where λl(xk) ≥ 0,
∑n
l=0 λl(x) = 1 and each fl(xk;ω) is an extremal
selection of Φ(xk;ω). With this substitution, (8) becomes
lim inf
k→∞
[∫
Ω
gk(xk;ω)
T (xk − xref)dP
]
≤ 0.
By hypothesis (ii), we may use Fatou’s Lemma to interchange the order of integration and limit infimum, as
shown next: ∫
Ω
lim inf
k→∞
[
gk(xk;ω)
T (xk − xref)
]
dP ≤ 0.
Consequently, there is a set of positive measure U ⊆ Ω, over which the integrand is nonpositive or
lim inf
k→∞
[
gk(xk;ω)
T (xk − xref)
] ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ U.
Substituting the expression for gk, we obtain the following inequality.
lim inf
k→∞
[
(xk − xref)T
(
n∑
l=1
λl(xk)fl(xk;ω)
)]
≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ U.
As a result, for at least one index l ∈ {1, ..., n}, we have that
lim inf
k→∞
[
λl(xk)fl(xk;ω)
T (xk − xref)
] ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ U.
Since 0 ≤ λl(xk) ≤ 1, the following must be true for the above l:
lim inf
k→∞
[
fl(xk;ω)
T (xk − xref)
] ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ U.
Moreover, fl(xk;ω) ∈ Φ(xk;ω) since it is an extremal selection and we have that
lim inf
k→∞
[
inf
w∈Φ(xk;ω)
wT (xk − xref)
]
≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ U.
Since, this holds for any xref, it holds for the vector xref in the hypothesis and for a set of positive measure
U , we have that
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
[
inf
w∈Φ(x;ω)
wT (x− xref)
]
≤ 0,∀ω ∈ U.
This contradicts the hypothesis and condition (7) must hold for the expected value map.
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Proof of (b) Next, we show that when the condition (7) holds for the expected value map, for the given
xref ∈ K, the set L<(K,Φ) is bounded (possibly empty) where L<(K,Φ) is defined in (6). We proceed
by contradiction and assume that L<(K,Φ) is nonempty and unbounded. Then, there exists a sequence
{xk} ∈ L<(K,Φ) with ‖xk‖ → ∞. Since xk ∈ L<(K,Φ), we have for each k,
inf
y∈Φ(xk)
[
(xk − xref)T y
]
< 0.
This implies that for the sequence {xk}, we have that
lim inf
xk∈K,‖xk‖→∞
[
inf
w∈Φ(xk)
wT (xk − xref)
]
≤ 0.
But this contradicts the coercivity property of the expected value map proved earlier:
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
[
inf
w∈Φ(x)
wT (x− xref)
]
> 0.
This contradiction implies that L<(K,Φ) is bounded and by Theorem 7, SVI(K,Φ) is solvable.
3.2 SQVIs with single-valued mappings
Our first result is an extension of [10, Cor. 2.8.4] to the stochastic regime. In particular, we assume that the
mapping E [G(x;ω)] cannot be directly obtained; instead, we provide an existence statement that relies on
the scenario-based map G(x;ω).
Proposition 9 (Solvability of SQVI(K,F )). Suppose Assumptions 2 and 4 hold. Furthermore, suppose
there exists a bounded open set U ⊂ Rn and a vector xref ∈ U such that the following hold:
(a) For every x¯ ∈ cl(U), the image K(x¯) is nonempty and lim
x→x¯K(x) = K(x¯);
(b) xref ∈ K(x) for every x ∈ cl(U);
(c) L<(K,G;ω) ∩ bd(U) = ∅ holds almost surely, where
L<(K,G;ω) ,
{
x ∈ K(x) | (x− xref)TG(x;ω) < 0} . (9)
Then, SQVI(K,F ) has a solution where F (x) = E [G(x;ω)] .
Proof. Recall that by [10, Cor. 2.8.4], the stochastic SQVI(K,F ) is solvable if L<(K,F )∩bd(U) = ∅, where
L<(K,F ) ,
{
x ∈ K(x) | (x− xref)TE [G(x;ω)] < 0} .
We proceed by contradiction and assume that there exists an x ∈ L<(K,F ) and x ∈ bd(U). By assumption,
since L<(K,G;ω) ∩ bd(U) = ∅ and x ∈ bd(U), it follows that x /∈ L<(K,G;ω) almost surely. This
implies that (x − xref)TG(x;ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. It follows that (x − xref)TE[G(x;ω)] ≥ 0, implying
that x /∈ L<(K,F ). This contradicts our assertion that x ∈ L<(K,F ). Therefore, we must have that
L<(K,F ) ∩ bd(U) = ∅ and by [10, Cor. 2.8.4], the stochastic SQVI(K,F ) has a solution.
Another avenue for ascertaining existence of equilibrium in stochastic regimes is an extension of Harker’s
result [17, Th. 2] which we present next.
Theorem 10 (Solvability of SQVI(K,F ) under compactness). Suppose Assumptions 2 and 4 hold and
there exists a nonempty compact convex set Γ such that the following hold:
(i) K(x) ⊆ Γ, ∀x ∈ Γ;
(ii) K is a nonempty, continuous, closed and convex-valued mapping on Γ.
Then the SQVI(K,F ) has a solution.
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Proof. Since F is continuous by Assumption 2(ii), all conditions of [17, Th. 2] hold. Thus, the SQVI(K,F )
has a solution.
The above theorem relies on properties of the map K and the continuity of the map F to ascertain existence
of solution. By Assumption 2, continuity of the map F holds in the settings we consider and thus the
solvability of SQVI(K,F ) follows readily. This theorem has a slightly different flavor compared to other
results in this paper in the sense that we do not look at properties of the scenario-based map (other than
continuity) that then guarantee existence of solution. We have listed this theorem here for completeness as
it presents an alternate perspective of looking at the question of solvability of SQVI(K,F ).
3.3 SQVIs with multi-valued mappings
In this section, we relax the assumption of single-valuedness of the scenario-based mappings G(•;ω) and
instead allow for the map Φ(•;ω) to be multi-valued. In the spirit of the rest of this paper, our interest lies
in deriving results that do not rely on evaluation of expectation. We use the concepts of set-valued integrals
discussed in the previous section 2.3 and require that Assumption 4 holds throughout this subsection. Our
first existence result relies on a sufficiency condition for generalized quasi-variational inequalities [5, Cor. 3.1].
We recall [5, Cor. 3.1] which can be applied to the multi-valued SQVI(K,Φ).
Proposition 11 ([5, Cor. 3.1]). Consider the SQVI(K,Φ). Suppose that there exists a nonempty compact
convex set C such that the following hold:
(a) K(C) ⊆ C;
(b) E[Φ(x;ω)] is a nonempty contractible-valued and compact-valued upper semicontinuous mapping on
C;
(c) K is nonempty continuous convex-valued mapping on C.
Then the stochastic SQVI(K,Φ) admits a solution
However, this result requires evaluating E[Φ(x;ω)], an object that admits far less tractability; instead, we
develop almost-sure sufficiency conditions that imply the requirements of Proposition 11.
Proposition 12 (Solvability of SQVI(K,Φ))). Suppose Assumptions 3 ans 4 hold. Furthermore, suppose
there exists a nonempty compact convex set C such that the following hold:
(a) K(C) ⊆ C;
(b) Φ(x;ω) is a nonempty upper semicontinuous mapping for x ∈ C in an almost-sure sense;
(c) K is nonempty, continuous and convex-valued mapping on C.
Then the stochastic SQVI(K,Φ) admits a solution.
Proof. From Proposition 11, it suffices to show that under the above assumptions, E[Φ(x;ω)] is a nonempty
contractible-valued, compact-valued, upper semicontinuous mapping on C.
(i) E[Φ(x;ω)] is nonempty: Since Φ(x;ω) is lower semicontinuous, it is a measurable set-valued map. Since
it is a measurable set-valued map with nonempty closed images, by Aumann’s measurable selection
theorem [1, Th. 8.1.3], there exists a measurable selection h from Φ(x;ω). Since Φ(x;ω) is integrably
bounded, every measurable selection is integrable. Thus,
∫
Ω
hdP ∈ ∫
Ω
Φ(x;ω), implying that E[Φ(x;ω)]
is nonempty.
(ii) E[Φ(x;ω)] is contractible-valued: Since the probability space is nonatomic by definition, we have that
E[Φ(x;ω)] is a convex set. Since a convex set is contractible, we have that E[Φ(x;ω)] is contractible.
(iii) E[Φ(x;ω)] is compact-valued: Since Φ(x;ω) is integrably bounded, by [1, Th. 8.6.3], we get that
E[Φ(x;ω)] is compact.
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(iv) E[Φ(x;ω)] is upper semicontinuous: By hypothesis, we have that Φ(x;ω) is a measurable, integrably
bounded and upper-semicontinuous x ∈ C. Thus, from [2, Cor. 5.2], it follows that E[Φ(x;ω)] is upper
semicontinuous.
The previous result relies on the compact-valuedness of K with respect to a compact set C, a property
that cannot be universally guaranteed. An alternate result for deterministic generalized QVI problems [5,
Cor. 4.1] leverages coercivity properties of the map Φ(x) to claim existence of a solution. We state this result
next.
Proposition 13 ([5, Cor. 4.1]). Let K be a set-valued map from Rn to subsets of Rn and Φ from Rn to
subsets of Rn be a measurable integrably bounded set-valued map with closed nonempty images. Suppose
that there exists a vector xref such that
xref ∈
⋂
x∈dom(K)
K(x)
and lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
[
inf
y∈Φ(x)
(x− xref)T y
‖x‖
]
=∞. (10)
Suppose the following hold:
(i) Φ(x) is a nonempty, contractible-valued, compact-valued, upper semicontinuous map on Rn;
(ii) K is convex-valued;
(iii) There exists a ρ0 > 0 such that K(x) ∩ Bρ is a continuous mapping for all ρ > ρ0 where Bρ is a ball
of radius ρ centered at the origin.
Then for each vector q, SQVI(K,Φ + q) has a solution. Moreover, there exists an r > 0 such that ‖x∗‖ < r
for each solution (x∗, y∗).
In the next proposition, by using the properties of Φ(x;ω), we develop an integration-free analog of this
result for multi-valued SQVI(K,Φ).
Proposition 14 (Solvability of SQVI(K,Φ)). Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Suppose that there exists
a vector xref such that
(i) xref ∈ ⋂
x∈dom(K)
K(x);
(ii)
lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
[
inf
y∈Φ(x;ω)
(x− xref)T y
‖x‖
]
=∞, a.s. (11)
(iii) For the above xref, suppose there exists a nonnegative integrable function U(ω) such that g(x;ω)T (x−
xref) ≥ −U(ω) holds almost surely for any integrable selection g(x;ω) of Φ(x;ω) and for any x.
(iv) Φ(x;ω) is an upper semicontinuous mapping on Rn in an almost-sure sense;
(v) There exists a ρ0 > 0 such that K(x) ∩Bρ is a continuous mapping for all ρ > ρ0.
Then for each vector q the stochastic SQVI(K,Φ + q) has a solution. Moreover, there exists an r > 0 such
that ‖x∗‖ < r for each solution (x∗, y∗).
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Proof. First we show that (11) implies that the coercivity property (10) holds for the expected-value map
Φ(x) = E[Φ(x;ω)]. We proceed by contradiction and assume that E[Φ(x;ω)] does not satisfy (10). Then,
there exists a subsequence {xk}k∈K such that
lim
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk),k∈K
[
inf
y∈E[Φ(xk;ω)]
(xk − xref)T y
‖xk‖
]
<∞.
In other words, we have that
lim inf
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[
inf
y∈E[Φ(xk;ω)]
(xk − xref)T y
‖xk‖
]
<∞.
Since Φ(xk;ω) is integrably bounded, we have that E[Φ(xk;ω)] is compact (by [1, Th. 8.6.3]) and therefore
it is a closed set. Thus, we may conclude that there exists a yk ∈ E[Φ(xk;ω)] for which the infimum is
attained and the above statement can be rewritten as follows:
lim inf
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[
(xk − xref)T yk
‖xk‖
]
<∞, where yk ∈ E[Φ(xk;ω)].
By Lemma 6, yk =
∫
Ω
gk(xk;ω)dP where gk(xk;ω) =
∑n
j=0 λj(xk)fj(xk;ω) where λj(xk) ≥ 0,
∑n
j=0 λj(xk) =
1 and each fj(xk;ω) is an extremal selection of Φ(xk;ω). Thus, we can write the above limit as
lim inf
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[∫
Ω
(xk − xref)T gk(xk;ω)
‖xk‖ dP
]
<∞.
Since, fj(xk;ω) is integrable for every j = 0, . . . , n, each gk(xk;ω) is integrable. Hypothesis (iii) allows for
the application of Fatou’s lemma, through which we have that the following sequence of inequalities:∫
Ω
lim inf
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[
(xk − xref)T gk(xk;ω)
‖xk‖
]
dP ≤ lim inf
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[∫
Ω
(xk − xref)T gk(xk;ω)
‖xk‖ dP
]
<∞.
But this implies that the integrand must be finite almost surely. In other words, we obtain that
lim inf
‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[
(xk − xref)T gk(xk;ω)
‖xk‖
]
<∞, a.s.
As a consequence,
∞ >
 lim inf‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[
gk(xk;ω)
T (xk − xref)
‖xk‖
] ≥
 lim inf‖xk‖→∞,
xk∈K(xk)
[
inf
yk∈Φ(xk;ω)
(xk − xref)T yk
‖xk‖
] a.s..
But this contradicts hypothesis (11). It follows that the coercivity requirement (10) holds for Φ(x) =
E[Φ(x;ω)] and the required existence result follows.
Further, from the proof of the Proposition 12, we may claim that E[Φ(x;ω)] is a nonempty contractible-
valued, compact-valued, upper semicontinuous mapping on Rn and from Assumption 4, the map K is
convex-valued. Thus, all the hypotheses of Proposition 13 are satisfied and the multi-valued SQVI(K,Φ)
admits a solution.
4 Stochastic complementarity problems
When the set K in a VI(K,F ) is a cone in Rn, then the VI(K,F ) is equivalent to a CP(K,F ) [24]. Our
approach in the previous sections required us to assume that the map K was deterministic. In practical
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settings, however, the map K may take on a variety of forms. For instance, K may be defined by a set of
algebraic resource or budget constraints in financial applications, capacity constraints in network settings or
supply and demand constraints in economic equilibrium settings. Naturally, these constraints may often be
expectation or risk-based constraints. In such an instance, a complementarity approach assumes relevance.
Consider an optimization problem with expectation constraints:
min E[f(x;ω)]
subject to E[c(x, ω)] ≤ 0, (λ)
x ≥ 0.
(12)
where f(x, ω) and c(x, ω) are convex and continuously differentiable functions in x for every ω. Then, under
a suitable regularity condition and allowing for the interchange of derivative and expectations, the necessary
and sufficient conditions of optimality are given by[
0 ≤ x ⊥ E[∇xf(x;ω) +∇xc(x;ω)Tλ] ≥ 0
0 ≤ λ ⊥ −E[c(x;ω)] ≥ 0.
]
≡ [R+m+n 3 z ⊥ F (z) ∈ R+m+n] , (13)
where z , (x;λ) and F (z) is defined as follows:
F (z) ,
(
E[∇xf(x;ω) +∇xc(x;ω)Tλ]
−E[c(x;ω)]
)
.
Specifically, in such a case, this problem is defined in the joint space of primal variables and the Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the stochastic constraints. Such a transformation yields a stochastic complemen-
tarity problem SCP(K,F ) where the map F may be expectation-valued while the set K is a deterministic
cone. However, such complementarity problems may also arise naturally, as is the case when modeling
frictional contact problems [10] and stochastic counterparts of such problems emerge from attempting to
model risk and uncertainty. In the remainder of this section, we consider complementarity problems with
single-valued maps. Before proceeding, we provide a set of definitions.
Definition 4.1 (CP(K, q,M)). Given a cone K in Rn, an n × n matrix M and a vector q ∈ Rn, the
complementarity problem CP(K, q,M) requires an x ∈ K,Mx+ q ∈ K∗ such that xT (Mx+ q) = 0.
Recall, from section 1.1, K∗ , {y : yT d ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ K}. The recession cone, denoted by K∞, is defined as
follows.
Definition 4.2 (Recession cone K∞). The recession cone associated with a set K (not necessairly a cone)
is defined as K∞ , {d : for some x ∈ K, {x+ τd : τ ≥ 0} ⊆ K}.
Note that when K is a closed and convex cone, K∞ = K. Next, we define the CP kernel of a pair (K,M)
and define its R0 variant.
Definition 4.3 (CP kernel of the pair (K,M) (K(K,M))). The CP kernel of the pair (K,M) denoted by
K(K,M) is given by K(K,M) = SOL(K∞, 0,M).
Definition 4.4 (R0 pair (K,M)). (K,M) is said to be an R0 pair if K(K,M) = {0}.
From [10, Th. 2.5.6], when K is a closed and convex cone, (K,M) is an R0 pair if and only if the solutions
of the CP(K, q,M) are uniformly bounded for all q belonging to a bounded set.
Definition 4.5. Let K be a cone in Rn and M be an n× n matrix. Then M is said to be
(a) copositive on K if xTMx ≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ K;
(b) strictly copositive on K if xTMx > 0, ∀ x ∈ K\{0}.
The main result in this section is an almost-sure sufficiency condition for the solvability of a stochastic
complementarity problem SCP(K,F ). We now state the following sufficiency condition [10, Th. 2.6.1] for the
solvability of deterministic complementarity problems which is subsequently used in analyzing the stochastic
generalizations.
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Theorem 15. Let K be a nonempty, closed, and convex cone in Rn and let F be a continuous map from
K into Rn. If there exists a copositive matrix E ∈ Rn×n on K such that (K,E) is an R0 pair and the union⋃
τ>0
SOL(K,F + τE)
is bounded, then the CP(K,F ) has a solution.
Recall that in our notation for SCP(K,F ), F (x) = E[G(x;ω)].
We are now prepared to prove our main result.
Theorem 16 (Solvability of SCP(K,F )). Consider the stochastic complementarity problem SCP(K,F ).
Suppose Assumption 2 holds for the mapping F . Further suppose either (i.a) or (i.b) hold in addition to (ii):
(i.a) Suppose K , R+n and M is a nonzero copositive matrix on K such that (R+n ,M) is an R0 pair. In
addition, suppose the following holds:
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
G(x;ω) > 0, a.s. (14)
(i.b) Suppose K is a nonempty convex cone and M is a nonzero copositive matrix on K such that (K,M)
is an R0 pair. In addition, suppose the following holds:
lim inf
x∈K,‖x‖→∞
[
xTG(x;ω)
]
> 0, a.s. (15)
(ii) Suppose there exists a nonnegative integrable function u(ω) such that xTG(x;ω) ≥ −u(ω) holds almost
surely for any x.
Then the stochastic complementarity problem SCP(K,F ) admits a solution.
Proof. (i.a.) and (ii) hold. Note that if (14) holds, since K is the nonnegative orthant and ‖xk‖ → ∞ as
k →∞, we must have ‖xk‖ > 0 for sufficiently large k. From hypothesis (14), we have that (16) holds:
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
xTG(x;ω)
]
> 0, a.s. (16)
We proceed to show that the set T is bounded where (R+n ,M) is an R0 pair and T is defined as
T ,
⋃
τ>0
SOL(K,F + τM). (17)
It suffices to show that there exists an m > 0 such that for all x ∈ K, ‖x‖ > m implies x /∈ T . Suppose there
is no such finite m, implying that
for any m > 0, ∃ x ∈ K, ‖x‖ > m and x ∈ T. (18)
For each k > 0, choose xk ∈ K such that ‖xk‖ > k and xk ∈ T . For this sequence ‖xk‖ → ∞. Since ‖xk‖ > k
observe that for any k, xk 6= 0. Now, for each k, since xk ∈ T , it follows that xk ∈ SOL(K,F + τkM) for
some τk > 0. Thus, for each k we have x
T
k F (xk) + τkx
T
kMxk = 0. Since xk 6= 0 this means that for each k,
xTk F (xk) = E[xTkG(xk;ω)] = −τkxTkMxk. (19)
Observe that, since xk ∈ K and ‖xk‖ → ∞, we have xk 6= 0. Further, since M is copositive we have
xTkMxk ≥ 0. Since ‖xk‖ → ∞, we have that xTkMxk ≥ 0. Since τk > 0, there are three possibilities for the
sequence τkx
T
kMxk: τkx
T
kMxk → +∞, τkxTkMxk →  > 0, or τkxTkMxk → 0 as k → ∞. In any of these
cases, as k →∞ from (19) we can conclude
lim inf
k→∞
xTk F (xk) = lim inf
k→∞
[
E[xTkG(xk;ω)]
]
= lim inf
k→∞
[−τkxTkMxk] ≤ 0. (20)
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On the other hand, by (16) we have that
lim inf
k→∞,xk∈K
xTkG(xk;ω) > 0 a.s. (21)
By hypothesis (ii), Fatou’s lemma can be applied, giving us
lim inf
k→∞
xTk F (xk) = lim inf
k→∞
[
E
[
xTkG(xk;ω)
]] ≥ E [lim inf
k→∞
xTkG(xk;ω)
]
> 0, (22)
where the last inequality follows from (21). But this contradicts (20) and implies that there is a scalar m
such that x ∈ K, ‖x‖ > m implies x /∈ T . In other words, T is bounded. We have shown that all the
conditions of Theorem 15 are satisfied and we may conclude that the stochastic complementarity problem
SCP(K,F ) has a solution.
(i.b.) and (ii) hold. We proceed to show that the set T is bounded where (K,M) is an R0 pair and T is
defined as follows:
T ,
⋃
τ>0
SOL(K,F + τM). (23)
As earlier, it suffices to show that there exists an m > 0 such that for all x ∈ K, ‖x‖ > m implies x /∈ T .
Suppose there is no such m implying that
for any m > 0 ∃x ∈ K, ‖x‖ > m and x ∈ T. (24)
Construct a sequence {xk} as follows: For each m = k > 0, choose xk ∈ K such that xk ∈ K, ‖xk‖ > k and
xk ∈ T . For this sequence ‖xk‖ → ∞. Since ‖xk‖ > k observe that for any k, xk 6= 0. Now, for each k
since xk ∈ T , it follows that xk ∈ SOL(K,F + τkM) for some τk > 0. Thus, for each k, we have xk > 0,
F (xk) + τkMxk ≥ 0, τk > 0 and xTk F (xk) + τkxTkMxk = 0. Since xk 6= 0 and M is copositive and (K,M) is
an R0 pair we have that x
T
kMxk ≥ 0. This together with τk > 0 means that for each k,
E[xTkG(xk;ω)] = xTk F (xk) = −τkxTkMxk ≤ 0.
This gives us that
lim inf
k→∞
E[xTkG(xk;ω)] = lim inf
k→∞
[−τkxTkMxk] ≤ 0. (25)
On the other hand, since xk ∈ K and ‖xk‖ → ∞, by hypothesis (15) we have that
lim inf
k→∞
xTkG(xk;ω) > 0 a.s.
This means that
E
[
lim inf
k→∞
xTkG(xk;ω)
]
> 0. (26)
Now, by hypothesis (ii), Fatou’s lemma is applicable, implying that
lim inf
k→∞
E
[
xTkG(xk;ω)
] ≥ E [lim inf
k→∞
xTkH(xk;ω)
]
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from (26). This contradicts (25). This contradiction implies that there
exists an m such that x ∈ K, ‖x‖ > m implies x /∈ T . In other words, T is bounded. By hypothesis, we
have that there exists a copositive matrix M on K such that (K,M) is an R0 pair and we have shown that
T is bounded. Thus, all conditions of Theorem 15 are satisfied and we may conclude that the stochastic
complementarity problem SCP(K,F ) has a solution.
21
Remark. It is worth emphasizing that while hypothesis (i.a) implies hypothesis (i.b) holds, in general, if
(R+n ,M) is an R0 pair, it is not true that the same matrix M forms an (K,M) is an R0 pair.
We now consider several corollaries, the first of which requires defining a co-coercive mapping.
Definition 4.6 (Co-coercive function). A mapping F : K ⊆ Rn → Rn is said to be co-coercive on K if
there exists a constant c > 0 such that
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≥ c‖F (x)− F (y)‖2, ∀x, y ∈ K.
We state Cor. [10, Cor. 2.6.3], which is used in the proof of the next proposition.
Corollary 17. Let K be a pointed, closed, convex cone in Rn and let G : Rn → Rn be a continuous map.
If F is co-coercive on Rn, then CP(K,F ) has a nonempty compact solution set if and only if there exists a
vector u ∈ Rn satisfying F (u) ∈ int(K∗).
Our next result provides sufficiency conditions for the existence of a solution to an SCP when an additional
co-coercivity assumption is imposed on the mapping. In particular, we assume that the mapping H(z;ω) is
co-coercive for almost every ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 18 (Solvability under co-coercivity). Let K be a pointed, closed and convex cone in Rn.
Suppose Assumption 2 holds for the mapping G(x;ω) and G(x;ω) is co-coercive on K with constant η(ω) > 0.
Suppose η(ω) ≥ η¯ > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω¯ where P(Ω¯) = 1 and there exists a deterministic vector u ∈ Rn satisfying
G(u;ω) ∈ int(K∗) in an almost sure sense. Then the solution set of the SCP(K,F ) is a nonempty and
compact set.
Proof. First we show that, E [G(x;ω)] is co-coercive in x. We begin by noting that
(x− y)T (E [G(x;ω)]− E [G(y;ω)]) =
∫
Ω
(x− y)T (G(x;ω)−G(y;ω))dP
=
∫
Ω¯
(x− y)T (G(x;ω)−G(y;ω))dP,
where the second equality follows by noting that P(Ω¯) = 1. This allows us to conclude that∫
Ω¯
(x− y)T (G(x;ω)−G(y;ω))dP ≥
∫
Ω¯
η(ω)‖G(x;ω)−G(y;ω)‖2dP
≥ η¯
∫
Ω¯
‖G(x;ω)−G(y;ω)‖2 dP,
where the first inequality follows from the co-coercivity of G(x;ω), the second inequality follows from noting
that η(ω) ≥ η¯ for ω ∈ Ω¯, a set of unitary measure. Finally, by again recalling that Ω¯ has measure one and
by leveraging Jensen’s inequality since ‖.‖2 is a convex function, the required result follows:
η¯
∫
Ω¯
‖G(x;ω)−G(y;ω)‖2 dP = η¯
∫
Ω
‖G(x;ω)−G(y;ω)‖2 dP ≥ η¯ ‖E [G(x;ω)]− E [G(y;ω)]‖2 .
Further, since G(u;ω) ∈ int(K∗) holds almost surely for a deterministic vector u, we have that for all x ∈ K,
G(u;ω)Tx ≥ 0 holds almost surely. This implies that for all x ∈ K,E [G(u;ω)]T x ≥ 0 holds. Thus, there
exists a u ∈ Rn such that E [G(u;ω)] ∈ K∗.
It remains to show that E [G(u;ω)] lies in int(K∗). If E [G(u;ω)] /∈ int(K∗), then there exists an x ∈ K such
that E [G(u;ω)]T x = 0. Since x ∈ K and by assumption, G(u;ω) ∈ int(K∗) almost surely, it follows that
G(u;ω)Tx > 0 almost surely, implying that E [H(u;ω)]T x > 0. Thus, we arrive at a contradiction, proving
that E [G(u;ω)] ∈ int(K∗). Thus, by Corollary 17, since E [H(z;ω)] is co-coercive and there is a vector
u ∈ Rn such that E [G(u;ω)] ∈ int(K∗), it follows that SCP(K,F ) has a nonempty compact solution set.
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The next corollary is a direct application of Theorem 15 to SCP(K,F ) when E is the identity matrix and
can be viewed as a theorem of the alternative for CPs.
Corollary 19 (Cor. 2.6.2 [10]). Let K be a closed convex cone in Rn and let G(x;ω) satisfy Assumption 2.
Either SCP(K,F ) has a solution or there exists an unbounded sequence of vectors {xk} and a sequence of
positive scalars {τk} such that for every k, the following complementarity condition holds:
K 3 xk ⊥ E [G(xk;ω)] + τkxk ∈ K∗.
We may leverage this result in deriving a stochastic generalization.
Proposition 20 (Theorem of the alternative). Let K be a closed convex cone in Rn and let G(x;ω) be a
mapping that satisfies Assumption 2. Either SCP(K,F ) has a solution or there exists an unbounded sequence
of vectors {xk} and a sequence of positive scalars {τk} such that for every k, the following complementarity
condition holds almost-surely:
K 3 xk ⊥ G(xk;ω) + τkxk ∈ K∗. (27)
Proof. Suppose (27) holds almost surely. Consequently, it also holds in expectation or
K 3 xk ⊥ E[G(xk;ω)] + τkxk ∈ K∗. (28)
Therefore by Cor. 19, SCP(K,F ) does not admit a solution.
5 Examples revisited
We now revisit the motivating examples presented in Section 2 and show the applicability of the developed
sufficiency conditions in the context of such problems.
5.1 Stochastic Nash-Cournot games with nonsmooth price functions
In Section 2.2, we described a stochastic Nash-Cournot game in which the price functions were nonsmooth.
We revisit this example in showing the associated stochastic quasi-variational inequality problem is solvable.
Before proceeding, we recall that fi(x;ω) is a convex function of xi, given x−i (see [21, Lemma 1]).
Lemma 21. Consider the function fi(x;ω) = ci(xi) − xip(X;ω) where p(X;ω) is given by (4). Then
fi(xi;x−i) is a convex function in xi for all x−i.
The convexity of fi and Ki(x−i) allows us to claim that the first-order optimality conditions are sufficient;
these conditions are given by a multi-valued quasi-variational inequality SQVI(K,Φ) where Φ(x), the Carte-
sian product of generalized gradients, is defined as
Φ(x) , E
[
N∏
i=1
∂xifi(x;ω)
]
,
and Φ(x;ω) is defined as
∏N
i=1 ∂xifi(x;ω). The subdifferential set of fi(x;ω) is defined as
∂xifi(x;ω) = c
′
i(xi)− ∂xi(xip(X;ω)) = c′i(xi)− p(X;ω)− xi∂xip(X;ω).
Thus, if w ∈ Φ(x;ω), then w = ∏ni=1 wi where wi ∈ ∂xifi(x;ω). Based on the piecewise smooth nature of
p(X;ω), the Clarke generalized gradient of p is defined as follows:
∂xip(X;ω) ∈

{−b1(ω)}, 0 ≤ X < β1
−[bj−1(ω), bj(ω)], βj−1 = X, j = 2, . . . , s
{−bs(ω)}, βs < X
(29)
Since our interest lies in showing the applicability of our sufficiency conditions when the map Φ is expectation
valued, we impose the required assumptions on the map K as captured by Prop. 14 (i) and (v). Existence
of a nonsmooth stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium follows from showing that hypotheses (ii) – (iv) of
Prop. 14 do indeed hold.
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Theorem 22 (Existence of stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium). Consider the stochastic generalized
Nash-Cournot game and suppose Assumptions 3, 4 and 5 hold. Further, assume that conditions (i) and (v)
of Prop. 14 hold. Then, this game admits an equilibrium.
Proof. Since ∂xifi(x;ω) is a Clarke generalized gradient, it is a nonempty upper semicontinuous mapping
at xi, given x−i. Furthermore, the integrability of (aj(ω), bj(ω)) for j = 1, . . . , s allows us to claim that
∂xifi(x;ω) is integrably bounded. Consequently, hypothesis (iv) in Proposition 14 holds.
By Assumption 5, since ai(ω) and bi(ω) are positive, we have that they are bounded below by the nonnegative
constant (integrable) function 0. From, this and the description of Φ derived above, we see that hypothesis
(iii) in Prop. 14 holds. Thus Fatou’s lemma can be applied.
We now proceed to show that hypothesis (ii) in Proposition 14 holds. It suffices to show that there exists
an xref ∈ K(x) such that
lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
(
inf
w∈Φ(x;ω)
(x− xref)Tw
‖x‖
)
=∞.
Consider a vector xref such that
xref ∈
⋂
x ∈ dom(K)
K(x).
Then wT (x− xref) can be expressed as the sum of several terms:
wT (x− xref) =
N∑
i=1
c′i(xi)(xi − xrefi )− p(X;ω)(x− xref)−
N∑
i=1
xi(xi − xrefi )∂xip(X;ω).
When ‖x‖ → ∞, from the nonnegativity of x, it follows that X → ∞ and for sufficiently large X, we have
that ∂xip(X;ω) = −bs(ω). Consequently, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, we have that
lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
inf
w∈Φ(x;ω)
(x− xref)Tw
‖x‖
= lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
(∑N
i=1(c
′
i(xi) + b
s(ω)xi)(xi − xrefi )
‖x‖
)
− lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
(
p(X;ω)(x− xref)
‖x‖
)
= lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
Term (a)︷ ︸︸ ︷(∑N
i=1(c
′
i(xi) + b
s(ω)(X + xi))(xi − xrefi )
‖x‖
)
− lim
‖x‖→∞,x∈K(x)
Term (b)︷ ︸︸ ︷(
as(ω)(x− xref)
‖x‖
)
=∞,
where the last equality is a consequence of noting that the numerator of Term (a) tends to +∞ at a quadratic
rate while the numerator of Term (b) tends to +∞ at a linear rate. The existence of an equilibrium follows
from the application of Prop. 14.
5.2 Strategic behavior in power markets
In Section 2.2, we have presented a model for strategic behavior in imperfectly competitive electricity markets.
We will now develop a stochastic complementarity-based formulation of such a problem. The developed
sufficiency conditions will then be applied to this problem.
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Recall that, the resulting problem faced by firm f can be stated as follows:
maximize
sfi, gfi
E
[∑
i∈N
( pi(Si;ω)sfi − cfi(gfi;ω)− (sfi − gfi)wi )
]
subject to gfi ≤ capfi (µfi ), ∀ i ∈ N
0 ≤ gfi, ∀ i ∈ N
0 ≤ sfi, ∀ i ∈ N
and
∑
i∈N
( sfi − gfi ) = 0. (λf )
The equilibrium conditions of this problem are given by the following complementarity problem.
0 ≤ sfi ⊥ E [−p′i(Si;ω)sfi − pi(Si;ω) + wi]− λf ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N
0 ≤ gfi ⊥ E
[
c′fi(gfi;ω)− wi
]
+ µfi + λf ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N
0 ≤ µfi ⊥ capfi − gfi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N
λf ⊥
∑
i∈N
( sfi − gfi ) = 0. ∀ f ∈ F
The ISO’s optimization problem is given by
maximize
yi
∑
i∈N
yiwi
subject to
∑
i∈N
PDFijyi ≤ Tj , (ηj) ∀ j ∈ K
and its optimality conditions are as follows:
wi =
∑
j∈K
ηjPDFij ∀ i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ ηj ⊥ Tj −
∑
i∈N
PDFijyi ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ K.
(30)
The market clearing conditions are given by the following.
yi =
∑
h∈F
( shi − ghi ) , ∀ i ∈ N .
Next, we define `i(ω) and hi(ω) as follows:
`i(ω) = −p′i(Si;ω)sfi − pi(Si;ω) + wi = −p′i(Si;ω)sfi − pi(Si;ω) +
∑
j∈K
ηjPDFij (31)
hi(ω) = c
′
fi(gfi;ω)− wi = c′fi(gfi;ω)−
∑
j∈K
ηjPDFij . (32)
Then, by aggregating all the equilibrium conditions together and eliminating wi and yi based on the equality
constraints (30), we get the equilibrium conditions in sfi, gfi, µfi, , λf , and ηj are as follows
0 ≤ sfi ⊥ E [`i(ω)]− λf ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N
0 ≤ gfi ⊥ E [hi(ω)] + µfi + λf ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N
0 ≤ µfi ⊥ capfi − gfi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N
λf ⊥
∑
i∈N
( sfi − gfi ) = 0,

, ∀ f ∈ F
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and 0 ≤ ηj ⊥ Tj −
∑
i∈N
PDFij
∑
h∈F
( shi − ghi ) ≥ 0. ∀ j ∈ K
This can be viewed as the following stochastic (mixed)-complementarity problem where x, B, and G(x;ω)
are appropriately defined:
0 ≤ x ⊥ E[G(x;ω)]−BTλ ≥ 0
λ ⊥ Bx = 0.
It follows that the inner product in the coercivity condition (15) reduces to xTE[G(x;ω)] as observed by this
simplification: (
x
λ
)T (E[G(x;ω)]−BTλ
Bx
)
= xTE[G(x;ω)].
Next, we show that this inner product is bounded from below by−u(ω) where u(ω) is a nonnegative integrable
function.
Lemma 23. For the stochastic complementarity problem SCP(K,F ) above that represents the strategic
behavior in power markets, there exists a nonnegative integrable function u(ω) such that have that the
following holds:
G(x;ω) = xTG(x;ω) ≥ −u(ω) almost surely for all x ∈ K.
Proof. The product xTG(x;ω) can be expressed as follows:
∑
f,i
−p′i(Si;ω)s2fi − pi(Si;ω)sfi +
∑
j∈K
ηjPDFij
 sfi

+
∑
f,i
c′fi(gfi;ω)gfi −
∑
j∈K
ηjPDFij
 gfi + µfigfi

+
∑
f,i
(
µficapfi − µfigfi
)
+
∑
j
ηj
(
Tj −
∑
i∈N
PDFij
∑
h∈F
( shi − ghi )
)
.
After appropriate cancellations, this reduces to∑
f,i
(−p′i(Si;ω)s2fi − pi(Si;ω)sfi)+∑
f,i
(
c′fi(gfi;ω)gfi
)
+
∑
f,i
(
µficapfi
)
+
∑
j
ηjTj .
By Assumption 6, the price functions are decreasing functions bounded above by an integrable function and
the cost functions are non-decreasing. Furthermore, K is the nonnegative orthant, µfi, ηj are nonnegative,
and capfi, Tj denote nonnegative capacities. Consequently, we have the following sequence of inequalities.∑
f,i
(−p′i(Si;ω)s2fi − pi(Si;ω)sfi)+∑
f,i
(
c′fi(gfi;ω)gfi
)
+
∑
f,i
(
µficapfi
)
+
∑
j
ηjTj
≥
∑
f,i
(−pi(Si;ω)sfi) ≥ −
(
max
i
p¯i(ω)
)∑
f,i
capfi , −u(ω),
where pi(Si;ω) ≤ p¯i(ω) for all nonnegative Si and
∑
f,i sfi ≤
∑
f,i capfi. Integrability of u(ω) follows
immediately by its definition.
Having presented the supporting results, we now prove the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 24 (Existence of an imperfectly competitive equilibrium). Consider the imperfectly competi-
tive model in power markets. Under Assumption 6, this problem admits a solution.
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Proof. The result follows by showing that Theorem 16 can be applied. Lemma 23 shows that hypothesis (ii)
of Theprem 16 holds. We proceed to show that hypothesis (i.b) of Theorem 16 also holds. We show that
the following property holds almost surely:
lim inf
‖x‖→∞, x≥0
xTG(x;ω) > 0. (33)
Consider the expression for xTG(x;ω) derived in Lemma 23.
xTG(x;ω) =
∑
f,i
(−p′i(Si;ω)s2fi − pi(Si;ω)sfi)+∑
f,i
(
c′fi(gfi;ω)gfi
)
+
∑
f,i
(
µficapfi
)
+
∑
j
ηjTj .
For large ‖x‖, the first summation is dominated by its first term and by Assumption 6, as ‖x‖ goes to ∞,
this term goes to ∞. The other terms are all nonnegative by Assumption 6. Thus, the entire expression can
only increase to ∞ as ‖x‖ goes to ∞. This proves that (33) holds and the required result follows.
6 Concluding Remarks
Finite-dimensional variational inequality and complementarity problems have proved to be extraordinarily
useful tools for modeling a range of equilibrium problems in engineering, economics, and finance. This avenue
of study is facilitated by the presence of a comprehensive theory for the solvability of variational inequality
problems and their variants. When such problems are complicated by uncertainty, a subclass of models lead
to variational problems whose maps contain expectations. A direct application of available theory requires
access to analytical forms of such integrals and their derivatives, severely limiting the utility of existing
sufficiency conditions for solvability.
To resolve this gap, we provide a set of integration-free sufficiency conditions for the existence of solutions to
variational inequality problems, quasi-variational generalizations, and complementarity problems in settings
where the maps are either single-valued or multi-valued. These conditions find utility in the existence of
equilibria in the context of generalized nonsmooth stochastic Nash-Cournot games and strategic problems
in power markets. We believe that these statements are but a first step in examining a range of problems
in stochastic regimes. These include the development of stability and sensitivity statements as well as the
consideration of broader mathematical objects such as stochastic differential variational inequality problems.
7 Appendix
Proof of Prop. 3.
Proof. Recall from [10, Ch. 2] that the solvability of SVI(K,F ) requires the existence of an xref such that
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
F (x)T (x− xref)] > 0. (34)
But we have that
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
F (x)T (x− xref)] = lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[∫
Ω
G(x;ω)T (x− xref)dP
]
.
By hypothesis (ii), we may apply Fatou’s lemma to obtain the following inequality:
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
F (x)T (x− xref)] ≥ ∫
Ω
lim inf
‖x‖→∞,x∈K
[
G(x;ω)T (x− xref)] dP > 0,
where the last inequality follows from the given hypothesis. Thus (34) holds and SVI(K,F ) has a solution.
Proof of Prop. 4.
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Proof. For the given xref ∈ K and for any x ∈ K, there exists a ν ∈ {1, . . . , N}, such that
lim inf
‖xν‖→∞,xν∈Kν
[
Gν(x;ω)
T (xν − xrefν )
]
> 0
holds almost surely. Thus we obtain
E
[
lim inf
‖xν‖→∞,xν∈Kν
Gν(x;ω)
T (xν − xrefν )
]
> 0.
By hypothesis (ii) above we may apply Fatou’s lemma to get
lim inf
‖xν‖→∞,xν∈Kν
E
[
Gν(x;ω)
T (xν − xrefν )
]
> 0.
This implies that C≤ is bounded where
C≤ :=
{
x ∈ K : max
1≤ν≤N
E
[
Gν(x;ω)
T (xν − xrefν )
] ≤ 0} .
From [10, Prop. 3.5.1], boundedness of C≤ allows us to conclude that SVI(K,F ) is solvable.
Proof of Cor. 5.
Proof. We begin with the observation that the monotonicity of G(x;ω) allows us to bound G(x;ω)T (x−xref)
from below as follows:
G(x;ω)T (x− xref) = [G(x;ω)−G(xref;ω)]T (x− xref) +G(xref;ω)T (x− xref) ≥ G(xref;ω)T (x− xref).
By utilizing this observation, we may complete the proof by using a similar avenue as followed in Prop. 3
(details omitted).
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